Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Summary

Hume, through Philo, criticizes the problem of evil, arguing that suffering, disease, natural disasters, and moral wrongs in the world do not fit with a perfectly good, all-powerful, and all-knowing God. The amount and nature of evil, especially that which seems pointless, raise doubts about the goodness or ability of a divine creator. This is an observation that challenges the core of traditional monotheistic theology. Common religious responses, such as free will or a greater good, often seem insufficient when faced with widespread suffering. Hume suggests that if we were to understand God's nature only from the observable world, we would conclude a deity that is either uncaring, limited in power, or morally unclear, rather than the perfect being of religious belief.

Cleanthes' main argument for God's existence is the design argument, comparing the universe to a complex machine (like a watch) that must have an intelligent maker. Hume, through Philo, takes apart this comparison. He argues that the comparison is weak because we have no experience with making universes. We see human objects and infer human makers, but we have no similar experience of worlds being created to infer a divine one. Also, even if we accept some order, the comparison is not strong enough to infer an infinite, perfect, or single maker. A complex machine could be the work of many lesser gods, an unskilled god, or even the result of random chance over long periods. The universe's 'design' might be more like a plant or an animal, which grows and reproduces without a conscious external maker, rather than a precisely built mechanism. Concluding a specific, all-perfect God from observed order is not justified.

Hume's empiricism supports his criticism of natural religion. He states that all our knowledge of cause and effect comes from repeatedly seeing them together. We see A consistently followed by B, and so we conclude a causal link. However, with the universe, we have no prior experience of worlds being created, nor do we have a basis for comparing different universes to find their creators. We have only this one universe, making any causal conclusion about its origin unique and thus unreliable by empirical standards. To conclude a divine creator from the universe is to apply a principle of cause and effect beyond our experience, which Hume deems improper. We cannot properly conclude properties of an unobservable cause (God) from a single observed effect (the universe) without having seen similar causes producing similar effects elsewhere.

In 'Of Miracles,' Hume argues against believing miraculous claims. He defines a miracle as a breaking of a law of nature. Laws of nature are established by consistent experience. Therefore, any report of a miracle must go against all universal human experience. It is always more likely that the witness is mistaken, fooled, or lying, than that a basic law of nature has been suspended. Hume lists several reasons why miracles are less believable: they are often reported by uneducated people, in distant times and places, and rarely by educated, fair witnesses. Also, religious miracles often cancel each other out, as different religions claim miracles for their own conflicting ideas. Thus, a reasonable person should always reject a miraculous claim unless the falseness of the testimony would be a greater miracle than the event it describes.

Hume criticizes the tendency to give God human traits, especially in the design argument. When we speak of God's intelligence, will, or goodness, we are using human ideas and experiences. Philo argues that if we infer a designer from the universe, that designer's traits should exactly match the observed effects. We observe a world with flaws, suffering, and a mix of order and disorder. To then give the designer infinite perfection, goodness, or power goes far beyond what the evidence shows. This human-like description limits God to human characteristics, possibly reducing the divine to a magnified human, rather than a truly superior and incomprehensible being. It also risks creating a deity in our own image, rather than finding a deity through objective study.

Hume, through Philo, presents a problem: if God has human traits, then God is limited and imperfect, like humans. But if God is stripped of all human-like traits (intelligence, will, personality) to keep divine superiority and perfection, then what remains is an abstract, unknowable force that is almost the same as the natural laws themselves. This 'abstract theism' offers no practical guidance, no moral rules, and no comfort. It becomes a mere philosophical idea, without religious meaning. The common religious need, Hume suggests, requires a God with whom humans can relate, implying human-like qualities. Thus, natural religion is caught between an imperfect, human-like deity and a meaningless, abstract one, failing to satisfy either reason or devotion.

Hume, especially through Philo, ultimately supports a form of moderate skepticism about natural religion. He shows that neither reason nor experience can provide a strong basis for proving the existence or specific traits of the traditional monotheistic God. Arguments from design, first cause, or the problem of evil all fail under close examination. Since we cannot definitively prove or disprove these ultimate truths, the most reasonable position is to not make a judgment. This does not necessarily lead to atheism, but rather to an acceptance of the limits of human understanding in these deep matters. For Hume, true devotion might even come from this skepticism, as it humbles human reason and allows for faith, though he often presents this with subtle irony. It discourages rigid belief and encourages intellectual modesty.

While Hume mainly criticizes the rational basis of religion, he implicitly acknowledges its social and psychological roles. Religion often provides moral frameworks, social unity, and comfort in the face of death. However, Hume also points out its possible dangers, such as superstition, extreme belief, and the promotion of fear (like the idea of eternal punishment, as Demea stresses). The 'savage, barbarous, and bloody' parts of religious history are not ignored. He suggests that the fear of a punishing deity might be a stronger reason for moral behavior than the love of a good one, indicating a practical, rather than philosophical, reason for its continued existence. This hints at a sociological understanding of religion, where its usefulness is separate from its truth, and where its potential for harm must be considered alongside any benefits.

Hume's work, especially 'Of Miracles,' shows the deep conflict between the demands of reason and the principles of revealed religion. If reason states that a miracle is the least likely event, then belief in miracles must fundamentally rely on faith, not on rational thought or empirical proof. Similarly, the 'Dialogues' show how rational arguments for God's existence are not enough, leading to the conclusion that if one believes, it must be for reasons beyond reason. This is not necessarily a rejection of faith, but a clear distinction: reason works within the limits of experience and logic, while faith, by its nature, goes beyond these. Attempts to force religious beliefs into a rational framework often weaken either the faith or the reason, leading to intellectual compromises that satisfy neither. Hume's implicit message is that one must ultimately choose between a system based on empirical reason or one based on revelation, as they do not easily fit together.